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Abstract
Th e authors of this text decided to prepare a short article, with the aim to induce 
further discussion and to orient ongoing and future research eff orts in Central and 
Eastern Europe but also worldwide. Th e article uses the method of a multi-country 
case study as the basis for proposing several critical research (and policy) challeng-
es for our region – but many of them of a world-wide character. Four countries 
are covered by our thumbnail informative sketches – the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic. Th e fi nal part of this article proposes a set of 
questions suggested by the CEE experience with COVID-19 for future research. 
Such research will both be necessary and interesting for scholarship and policy in 
the region, and – as a particularly interesting context and area – helpful, one hopes, 
for questions and answers globally, concerning the pandemic, as well as public ad-
ministration and policy as a whole.
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Introduction
Th e ongoing COVID-19 “era” is one of the most critical crises in recent human 
history and probably the most critical one of this century so far. Th e whole world 
is aff ected; tens of millions of people infected and more than a million deaths by 
October 2020 – and these are just direct epidemiologic data. Connected socio-eco-
nomic impacts may be similarly or possibly even much more critical – like econom-
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ic depression, growing unemployment, risk of falling into extreme poverty, hunger, 
deteriorating public services, closed schools, limited social contacts, etc. (see for 
example the recent joint statement by ILO, FAO, IFAD and WHO 2020).
It therefore comes as no surprise that this global crisis is a focus of interest of 
current academic literature. Maybe more than a million of articles and blog entries 
have been already published, hundreds of books and a high number of international 
journals decided to publish special issues related to COVID-19, and still do.
Th e editorial board of our journal assessed what is the best option for  NISPAcee 
to join this academic discussion and, in a broader perspective, the entire eff ort our 
societies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) need to make in order to tackle the 
unfolding challenge. We decided not to publish a special issue or special edited 
volume related to the COVID-19 pandemic, although we might do so in the future. 
Instead, we decided to prepare a short article, with the aim to induce further dis-
cussion and to orient ongoing and future research eff orts, taking into account espe-
cially the fact that in our opinion, too many key questions related to COVID-19 still 
do not have any defi nite, or even suffi  ciently corroborated, answers. Th e article uses 
the method of a multi-country case study as the basis for proposing several critical 
research (and policy) challenges for our region – but many of them of a world-wide 
character. Four CEE countries are covered by our thumbnail informative sketches 
– the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. For sure, this is 
not a representative, but only an illustrative selection, serving the purpose of this 
article. Instead of devising and following a uniform and strict descriptive-analytical 
framework for describing and comparing our cases, we chose to focus our country 
overviews on the specifi c issues pertinent to the given country possibly relevant for 
a broader cluster of countries in Central and Eastern Europe (and beyond).
Cases 1 – 2: Czech Republic and Slovakia
In terms of the capacity to prevent COVID-19 spread in the fi rst phase, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia were doing very well. According to available data we may 
state that Slovakia was among the most successful country in Europe in preventing 
the COVID-19 spread in spring 2020. Th e Czech data were a bit less positive, but 
still really good in a European comparative perspective.
Why have Slovakia and to a large extent also the Czech Republic been so suc-
cessful in fi ghting the fi rst phase of the spread of COVID-19? We assume that Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries featured a number of commonalities in terms 
of their substantive policy responses to the unfolding pandemic and – at least partly 
– contributing to their relative success in handling the Spring wave of the pandem-
ic. Two such core factors should be mentioned in relation to the Czech Republic 
and, especially, Slovakia. Firstly, the very fast and comprehensive anti-pandemic 
measures realized by their governments and secondly, the citizen’s compliance with 
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said measures. When the risks became evident, the Czech and Slovak governments 
delivered swift  and strict responses, which started in Slovakia even before the fi rst 
case was detected in the country (6 March 2020). Already on 14 February 2020, a 
system was organized at the Slovak borders to identify people who were ill and on 
27 February 2020, the health status border controls started. In early March, schools 
and universities were closed on a voluntary basis, without a central order. Most 
other critical measures were implemented very fast in both countries, like restric-
tion of visits in hospitals, social care establishments and prisons, prohibiting any 
mass activities, closing borders, closing schools, closing shops and services (with 
exceptions), a special regime in hospitals, limiting non-emergency treatments, 
compulsory wearing of protective face masks in all public spaces, limiting any kind 
of mobility, etc. People returning from abroad were requested to stay at home for 
quarantine, aft er 6 April in state establishments. Both countries applied limited re-
gional lock-downs. As indicated, the speed and scale of measures was supported by 
the fact that Czech and Slovak citizens have behaved very responsibly. Th e slogan 
“Stay at Home” was promoted and accepted; face masks used regularly.
Th e Czech and Slovak COVID-19 pandemic results for the fi rst phase were 
almost perfect from the epidemiologic point of view, however on the costs of a 
drastic impact of anti-epidemic measures on the national economy. To limit the 
negative impact of the pandemic on the national economy and on the social welfare, 
both states realized several measures; however, only an insuffi  cient amount of state 
subsidies has been “pumped in”, especially in Slovakia. Another limit is the fact that 
the anti-pandemic measures were not coordinated with neighbors and EU member 
states (for more see for example Nemec and Spacek 2020; Chubarova et al. 2020).
Th e critical negative specifi cs of the Czech Republic and Slovakia are con-
nected with the second phase of COVID-19 spread from summer 2020. Despite 
the experience with eff ectively managing the fi rst phase, both governments argued 
till the end of September that everything was under control and the newly growing 
number of COVID-19 cases (from mid of July) was fully manageable. Before early 
autumn both countries functioned in relaxed regimes, introduced in early sum-
mer, when COVID-19 almost disappeared. Only when the numbers of infected 
achieved record numbers, the Prime Ministers publicly announced the return to 
strict anti-pandemic measures, but in a diff erent way. Th e Czech PM apologized 
for his delayed reaction; the Slovak PM made the accusation that people’s limited 
discipline was the core source of problems. Because the restrictive measures started 
too late and people are not ready to comply, in both countries the second wave is 
not under control and the numbers of infected and deaths are several times higher 
compared to spring. In both countries the number of newly infected in late October 
per day was higher compared to the total numbers for the fi rst wave. In October the 
Czech Republic was one of the world-wide leading countries in relative spread of 
COVID-19 infections.
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Case 3: Estonia
Of all CEE countries, Estonia has the image of being the most modern and – espe-
cially in Digital Governance – the most progressive and advanced; oft en, Estonia 
is even seen as the global leader in governance digitization. And while this is not 
entirely accurate – the last fi gures (Ubaldi et al. 2019) even put Estonian e-gover-
nance below the global average (and from the CEE region, only Slovenia above it) 
– Estonia is still doing very well in this area (Drechsler 2018). Th e expectation was 
therefore that Estonia coped and is coping very well with the pandemic, premised 
especially on digital solutions, and journalists were even fi shing for corroboration 
for this perspective (Meaker 2020). But while Estonia handled the fi rst wave of the 
pandemic quite well, digital governance does not seem to have been the reason.
When COVID-19 hit Estonia, the country reacted with immediate border 
closings and a moderate lockdown. Since late April, restrictions were gradually lift -
ed, although many remain in place. Th e political response was more premised on 
global models (and here by its usual Scandinavian benchmark countries) than on 
the advice of Estonia’s own Health Board. Similar to the German model, current 
attempts to cope with the second wave are focused on local but rigid interventions, 
although there are serious policy confl icts between various institutions.
An Estonian specifi city in government is that it has three quasi-ministerial, 
quite autonomous super-bureaucrats – the Legal Chancellor, the State Secretary, 
and the State Auditor. During the pandemic, the former emerged as one of the most 
important critics of national and local restrictions and lockdowns, especially on 
mask wearing, which was pronounced scientifi cally unsound, together with claims 
by the main national medical expert – later revised – but against all international 
evidence (ERR 2020a). Th e State Auditor pointed out during the beginning of the 
second wave that Estonia lacked the basic capacity to responsibly deal with the crisis 
(ERR 2020b). Th is would corroborate that the oft -heard claim that regarding the 
pandemic, Estonia engaged in largely “performative governance” (Ding 2020) in 
that high outside pressure and expectation met low policy and administrative ca-
pacity, but that has hardly been substantially diff erent from many if not most other 
CEE and European countries, and certainly, Estonian results have been “not too 
bad” and remain so thus far during the second wave of the pandemic.
Estonian fi scal reaction, contrary to all previous crisis response which had 
been heavily austerity- – and consolidation- – oriented, has been an above-Euro-
pean-average stimulus package of 4.5 % of the GDP, facing a projected economic 
downturn of about 10 % (Raudla and Douglas 2020).
Regarding digital governance, the tracing app HOIA was developed as a PPP 
(as in most successful cases) for a very small amount (€ 30,000) and a lot of in-kind 
contributions, but it came, for many observers, quite late, as it was only launched 
in August 2020, in time for the second wave. Th ere are now 115,000 downloads 
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– slightly less than 10 % of the population (see Republic of Estonia, Health Board 
2020). Estonia’s rather strict privacy rules and security concerns, arguably more 
oriented towards the fear of Russian interference and global audiences than in-
ner-Estonian civil rights worries, were one of the reasons for this delay, and this has 
also led to several other techno-solutions not even being tried (Meijer et al. 2020). 
Th erefore, Estonia is a case where it would be very diffi  cult to argue for a move to-
wards any form of authoritarianism, in spite of a government coalition that includes 
a right-wing party, EKRE, which would certainly welcome any such move.
On the other hand, as Wired reported, “Estonia’s coronavirus response seems 
unremarkable because its digital capabilities have been blended into the country’s 
bureaucracy. … Estonia’s digital state has also enabled life in the country to con-
tinue, largely uninterrupted” (Meaker 2020). Th e digital capacities, including the 
ubiquitous digital signature, especially as regards public service delivery, allowed 
life to go on more easily from home offi  ce and home generally and enabled, e.g., 
remote teaching in schools and universities, if not smoothly, then at least more eas-
ily than in those countries which had not yet come around to such digital practices 
even by 2020.
Case 4: Hungary
Th e Hungarian government’s responses during the fi rst, spring wave of the pandem-
ic did not diff er signifi cantly from those of other V4 countries. Preparatory mea-
sures started well before the fi rst registered case (having appeared on 4 March). On 
31 January the government created the so-called Operative Group. Th is high-level 
monitoring and coordination body, still existing at the time of writing, was head-
ed by the Ministers of Interior and of Human Capacities and consisted of repre-
sentatives of various uniformed services and public health agencies. In terms of 
substantive policy responses, this initial period featured some soft  measures and 
recommendations only. Hard measures, including a ban on international travels, 
lockdown of all education institutions, severe restrictions on (non-COVID-19-re-
lated) outpatient health services and a closure of all but non-essential commercial 
facilities mostly followed within two weeks of detecting the fi rst cases.
It is likely that the eff ective containment of COVID-19, as well as the relatively 
low overall case numbers and, in particular, the relatively low frequency of related 
deaths, can partly be attributed – similarly to other countries of the region – to 
the indeed rapid lockdown measures. Note, however, that attributing the success 
of containment to eff ective social distancing alone is somewhat assailable. In their 
comparative analysis of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and 
Portugal Bartha et al. (2020) estimate, for example, that of these fi ve countries Hun-
gary featured the lowest relative decrease of citizens’ mobility as a result of social 
distancing measures.
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Whereas using the COVID-19 crisis to strengthen the – oft entimes autocrat-
ically spirited – grip on power is a well-discussed phenomenon in a broad range of 
countries, Hungary has been, and continues to be, very much in the vanguard of 
this trend since the early days of the crisis. Th e announcement (on 30 March) of a 
time-wise unlimited rule by decree superseding the legislature’s oversight capabil-
ities was, probably, the internationally most visible element in this series of mea-
sures. Albeit subsequently abolished by Parliament (on 16 June 2020), the corona 
virus-related special powers (Lührmann and Rooney 2020) are expected to have 
long-lasting consequences, as substitution bills are still in place.
Specifi cally, on the same day the institution of so-called “semi-extraordinary 
legal order” was introduced, providing the government with exceptional authority 
vis-à-vis Parliament (Mészáros 2020). Further, the Penal Code was modifi ed on 31 
March to include a very broad and “fl exibly applicable” regulation threatening not 
only “ordinary citizens” but the news media, too, whereby disseminating false or 
fact-distorting statements, if capable of “hindering or derailing the eff ectiveness of 
the response eff orts”, was made punishable by up to fi ve years in prison. Within 
only a matter of two months 131 criminal procedures were launched based on this 
provision (HVG 2020). Th e funding and authority of local governments – having 
become a key, and oft entimes successful, arena of the political opposition – have 
been severely cut back, thereby purposefully threatening and disabling the not-gov-
ernment-friendly local communities, their local governments and, in the fi nal anal-
ysis, the opposition parties and the healthy functioning of multiparty democracy 
(Hajnal et al. 2020).
Th e fi rst wave of the pandemic resulted, in sum, in minimal human losses, 
but an almost quantum leap in terms of further entrenchment of the institutions of 
illiberal rule. Economic losses were, in terms of GDP loss, similar to the EU average, 
albeit eff orts at alleviating them seem to be more modest than elsewhere (Bartha et 
al. 2020).
Th e policy priorities of the second wave were diff erent from those followed 
during the fi rst wave, and this diff erence was clear from the outset: in a broadly 
publicized interview, Prime Minister Orbán said that this time one should assess 
the government’s policy success not on the basis of the number of new infections 
but, rather, on the basis of corona-related deaths (www.koronavirus.gov.hu). De-
spite this specifi c approach, the Hungarian border was closed to foreigners from 
1 September 2020 (no other country in the region used this approach in autumn).
Th is policy is in eff ect at the time of writing: social distancing measures are 
largely absent (except obligatory face masks in indoor public settings), and – as a 
negative result – incidence fi gures are rapidly growing.
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Questions suggested by the CEE experience with COVID-19
Th e most obvious question connected to our case studies is – “Why did govern-
ments not use the spring experience to limit the impact of the expected second wave 
and why did they not prepare countries for the second wave better ?” Th e current 
pandemic eff ects, especially in the Czech Republic, suggest that such a question is 
really relevant and should be addressed somehow.
Politics should be one of the dimensions to investigate in relation to this 
question. Countries in our sample provide a really diff erent picture in relation 
to political aspects of reactions to the second wave. Th e Czech Prime Minister 
publicly apologized for the late reaction (HN 2020), the Slovak Prime Minister’s 
message to people was “you let me down” (TASR 2020), and the Hungarian Prime 
Minister publicly announced new approaches to COVID-19, whereas in Estonia, 
the second wave is being addressed as basically a continuation of the fi rst, only 
with a greater regional focus. Very diff erent reactions, but maybe all of them could 
be connected to what has oft en been described as a common, “non-publicized” 
fact – in the spring, governments (and people, too) greatly overestimated what 
turned out to be the actual lethal threat, based on severely limited knowledge. 
For example in Hungary, tens of thousands of hospital beds were suddenly made 
available with great political and human loss, and none of them were used in the 
end, 16,000 very expensive ventilators were imported, but none of the equipment 
has been used). Whether the low numbers were the consequences of other aspects 
of the severe reactions remains the countervailing question. Another factor, limit-
ing the capacity for fast reaction, could be the fact that political / popular support 
for harsh measures or even lockdown is much weaker now in autumn compared 
to spring – more and more people would simply not believe that the threat is real 
and are especially not any more ready to sacrifi ce their private rights because of 
COVID-19, and there is the general “pandemic fatigue” common in cases of elon-
gated threats even such as war.
Another critical element (besides politics) to investigate should be the ad-
ministrative capacity. In spring, all countries in our sample mobilized their ad-
ministrative capacities to “over-maximum” level. For example Slovakia, which has 
occasionally been evaluated as one of the least good administrative performers in 
the European Union (Palaric et al. 2017), managed tasks connected with pandemic 
spread in spring really well (at least results suggest so). However, already in spring, 
the country’s capacity to deal with economic and social consequences turned out 
to be very limited (Slovak socio-economic reactions seem to be the most limit-
ed from all four countries in our sample, for example from the point of the total 
sum and correct allocation of resources pumped into the national economy). Th e 
Hungarian case (huge allocations were made from the Disease Management Fund, 
but not in “proper” areas – for example to fi nance the usual stadium investments, 
World Hunting Exhibition, football clubs), however, indicates that the “quality” of 
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socio-economic responses of governments does not only have to be the result of the 
level of administrative capacities. Th e picture from summer, when the systems did 
not react in time and properly for the pandemic aspects of the COVID-19 crisis, 
may also suggest that limited administrative capacities may eff ectively react to an 
isolated problem, but not overall and in a long-term perspective.
Overall, it seems at the moment (October 2020) that the countries that have 
dealt with the crisis in a good way are the Confucian and the generally “Weberian” 
ones, from Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam to Germany and New Zealand, that 
are built on administrative competence and state resources (Mazzucato and Quag-
giotto 2020). In contrast, those countries where administrative capacity has been 
dismantled by NPM, fi rst and foremost the United States and the United Kingdom, 
are failing. Th is is of course not the only reason for a good pandemic response, 
nor is it apparently suffi  cient. It is also true that many East Asian countries were 
successful because they were prepared due to the SARS epidemic and its response, 
but the quality of that response, and institutional memory, so far seems to rest on a 
high-value, high-capacity civil service (Drechsler 2020).
However, it has also been argued that the success of disease control during 
the fi rst wave was not so much related to the quality of bureaucracies, inasmuch 
as failures (where they happened) were not so much those of implementation / bu-
reaucracy but failures of policy makers (delays in decision making, controversial 
decisions and communication, etc.). Yet, the correlation between bureaucracies 
that are generally deemed capacity-oriented and a good COVID-19 result seems 
ascertainable so far. So, this is one of the research questions which will be crucial to 
answer – because what is a public sector worth if it doesn’t help its country’s people 
to survive ? – but where a global and long-term scale will be important. Since CEE is 
a region with considerable variety in this respect, regional comparative studies may 
prove particularly fruitful once their time comes.
Another challenging issue to investigate is, “To what extent are citizens ready 
to give up their civil rights during a crisis ?” Th is question includes, for example, the 
time dimension (for how long), the scale dimension, personal diff erences and also 
countries’ diff erences (liberal-democratic versus authoritarian states – and here the 
paradox could set in that in the former countries, as there are more rights, it is easier 
for them to be relinquished). Resistance against harsh measures, especially if unex-
plained or arbitrary-seeming, is more and more visible almost everywhere. In some 
cases, court decisions support such resistance by claiming governmental measures 
adopted in relation to COVID-19 as illegal. In our sample, this is the reality for the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia – and this issue is also connected to administrative 
capacity: In most cases, negative court decisions are based on formal mistakes by 
the limitation-issuing authorities.
A closely connected issue to the above question is – “How to promote com-
pliance with social distancing rules ?” Many researchers dealing with COVID-19 
19
Public Policy during COVID-19: Challenges for Public Administration and Policy…
argue that compliance with the set of anti-pandemic measures by citizens is a crit-
ical success factor (from the point of control of the spread of infection). Slovakia, 
for example, was really successful from this point of view in spring, but not again 
in summer and autumn. As indicated also for Estonia, even top bureaucrats did 
not provide a consistent message in this relation. Is popular support for harsh and 
socially (extremely) costly measures (up to lockdown) possible to obtain and main-
tain unless a clear and highly visible crisis is there – with real casualties and visible 
suff ering ? Will the argument that harsh pandemic measures and health tolls actu-
ally do not clearly correlate with the economic performance of countries (Financial 
Times 2020) – as it seems at the time of writing – meet a receptive-enough audience, 
and if so, for how long ? Th e last but not least important element for this part is the 
question whether one should rely more on positive motivation to achieve compli-
ance (“We succeed together”) or on negative motivation by means of restrictions – 
but maybe this question does not have a defi nite answer both from the perspective 
of country / region and time.
Finally, for the public fi nance perspective, it will be really interesting to see, 
not least in the CEE context, what the diff erent fi nancial measures were, why they 
diff ered, how they were implemented and what eff ect they actually had – as with the 
Global Financial Crisis, we may see a paradigm shift  here, and with consequences 
for decades to come, so studying it in our area will be crucial both for the region 
and as a global sample.
Before concluding, we also need to stress that in this article all parts where we 
try to evaluate successes or failures in relation to fi ghting COVID-19 spread and 
its socio-economic consequences must be relativized. In reality, it is diffi  cult, if not 
impossible, to rank countries as successful or non-successful. Even fi gures which 
may look very reliable are rather problematic. Let us to look for example at the data 
about the absolute and relative number of deaths. Th e approaches of countries how 
to calculate this fi gure diff ers: should we count these who died “with COVID-19”, 
or only cases where COVID-19 was the primary reason of death ? In our sample, for 
example, the fi gures for Slovakia look problematic – by mid-October, the death toll 
is much less than 1 % – too low in the international comparison. Also, the number 
of infected is a problematic fi gure – for example, if few tests are delivered. Do people 
in evaluated countries really agree with diff erent rankings prepared by international 
institutions and think tanks – for example in relation to the position / evaluation of 
their country ? Th e research on many other political, institutional, economic, social, 
cultural and other consequences of the pandemic would be also really necessary. 
Just one example from our core area of research – how will the power balance, and 
the interaction, of diff erent levels of government shift  ? To what extent will the need 
for prompt, uniform and uncompromised crisis management decisions become 
part of our governments’ institutional memory and standard operating procedures, 
and to what extent will these stay institutionalized – possibly even overriding such 
previously undebated principles as subsidiarity – once the COVID-19 crisis ends ?
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Conclusions
As we said in the beginning, it is too early now to fi nd fi nal answers, but what is 
already possible is to open new lines of investigation and new dimensions in this 
general direction. Topics like COVID-19 and the possible switch to more author-
itarianism, central government, and administration / rule of experts, health versus 
economy trade-off s, the role of civil society during crises, international co-oper-
ation, etc., are really challenging but also just as important. Research about these 
topics in Central and Eastern Europe will also show us whether it is still possible 
to speak of the region as a region (Randma-Liiv and Drechsler 2017), but fi rst phe-
nomena seem to speak once again more for than against it. And once more, research 
in and about CEE will both be necessary and interesting for scholarship and policy 
in the region, and – as a particularly interesting context and area – helpful, one 
hopes, for questions and answers globally, concerning the pandemic, as well as pub-
lic administration and policy as a whole.
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